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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of management ownership i.e. director’s and 
commissioner’s shares, on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into stock 
prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity of Indonesian-listed firms over the 2013-
2015 period. Studies have shown that at least there are two effects of management ownership 
in prices i.e. convergence-of-interests effect and entrenchment effect. Also, previous research 
shows that stock price efficiency depends on the cost of acquiring private information. We 
hypothesize that these characteristics will manifest itself primarily in the firm-specific 
component of returns. Our empirical test finds that director’s and commissioner’s ownership 
in a company nonlinearly increase the probability of capitalization of firm’s specific 
information to stock prices. Thereby, making firm’s stock prices less synchronous to the 
market and the industry movements. Overall, our findings support the contention that 
ownership structure plays a significant role in shaping the firm’s information environment. 
Keywords: management ownership, stock price synchronicity, Indonesia 
JEL Classification: G14 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Efficient market hypothesis indirectly states that information is the key to the dynamic 
of stock prices which in turn will determine stocks‘ return. Roll (1988) finds that a large 
proportion of stock return variation is not explained by changes in market wide variables or 
by publication of value-related public information. Further, he says that it is an indication of 
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the amount and rate of private information capitalization into stock prices via informed 
trading. This study attracts a growing body of finance literature that provides consistent 
evidence with information-based interpretation of stock price synchronicity or firm-specific 
return variation. For example, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) examine worldwide 
synchronicity at the country level, and find that stock price movements are more synchronous 
in emerging markets with greater barriers to informed trading than in developed markets with 
lesser barrier. They argue that high synchronicity, commonly in emerging markets, is led by 
poor investor protection which discourages informed trading. Another follow up study, Jin 
and Myers (2006) show that synchronicity decreases with a country‘s accounting 
transparency. Latest studies by Fernandes and Ferreira (2008, 2009), Kim and Shi (2009), He 
et al. (2013), Hasan et al. (2014), and Lin et al. (2015) also argue synchronicity to be higher 
in emerging markets than in developed markets.    
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of corporate governance 
mechanism to synchronous movement of stock prices in the equity market of Indonesia. 
Corporate governance has been a hot topic since the financial crisis that delivered shock to 
the global economy (OECD, 2015). Earlier in Indonesia, weak corporate governance is seen 
as the main cause of economic crisis in 1998 (OECD, 2012). Corporate governance is aimed 
at enforcing rights and obligations of all stakeholders as proclaimed in the basic principles of 
corporate governance i.e. fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility. Hence, 
the discussion about the influence of corporate governance in the capital market is very 
attractive to be explored. 
This study is motivated by Ashbaugh et al. (2004) and Setyaningrum (2005) who 
investigated the effect of corporate governance, via multiple proxies, to corporate bond 
rating. Different with those studies, this study examines the influence of corporate 
governance to incorporation of company specific information into stock prices which is 
proxied by the stock price synchronicity. Moreover, this study use management ownership as 
the proxy of corporate governance as the interest variable as studies have not yet covered the 
topic.  
Researches about stock price synchronicity already cover multiple factor for example 
study to examine the association between stock price synchronicity and efficient capital 
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allocation (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1993; Wurgler, 2000), analyst activity (Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Chen and Hameed, 2006), earnings informativeness (Durnev et al, 2003), 
corporate transparency (Jin and Myers, 2006), voluntary disclosure (Haggard et al., 2008), 
earnings management (Hutton et al., 2009), audit quality (Gul et al., 2010), adoption of IFRS 
(Kim and Shi, 2012), and ownership structure (Boubaker et al., 2014). 
We study the link between synchronicity and corporate governance characteristics in 
Indonesia that are deemed to influence the flow of firm-specific information to equity market. 
This linkage emerges through the effects of corporate governance on management or 
managerial constraints and incentives, which are likely to influence the information 
environment and stock prices. Based on study by Ashbaugh et al. (2004) and Setyaningrum 
(2005), ownership in Indonesia scope at least still has some area underexplored in relation to 
stock price synchronicity. Both studies pin points that management ownership i.e. holding in 
by commissioners or directors in the company, has channel to influence company 
management incentives or managerial constraints as proxied against company bond rating. 
This study aims to close the gap by exploring relevancy to the topic of stock prices 
movement. 
Previous researches document that ownership structure affects the informational 
environment of a firm and its decision making. For instance, Ball et al. (2003) argue that, 
beyond accounting standards, the distribution of cash flow and voting rights shape the 
outcome of financial reporting procedures. Other studies also show that ownership structure 
turns out to explain earnings management (Warfield et al., 1995), earnings informativeness 
(Fan and Wong, 2002), analyst following (Lang et al., 2004; Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008), 
accounting conservatism (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008), and the cost of corporate 
borrowing (Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011), among others. This paper brings 
together strands of literature by addressing the important but hitherto underexplored question 
of whether ownership structure matters in explaining the synchronicity of stock price 
movements. The linkage is based on the classical idea that ownership structure affects 
managerial incentives and therefore exacerbates or mitigates agency problems between 
shareholders and professional managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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Morck and Vishny (1987) infer that there are two hypotheses when managers hold 
equity in the firm and shareholder are too dispersed to enforce value maximization. First, 
entrenchment hypothesis that is corporate assets may be deployed to benefit management 
rather than shareholders. Such managerial benefits can include shirking and perquisite-taking, 
but also encompass pursuit of such non-value-maximizing objectives as sales growth, empire 
building, and employee welfare. Second, convergence-of-interest hypotheses that is market 
value of company increases with management ownership. Further, as managements holding 
increases, managements pay a larger share of cost from value-maximization deviation and are 
less likely to squander corporate wealth. In relation to voluntary disclosure of company 
information to public, the entrenchment hypotheses have negative impact while convergence-
of-interest have the opposite. Disclosure have very important role in dynamics of stock return 
(Haggard et al., 2008). Hence, management ownership cannot be just ignored in the 
discussion of stock price synchronicity. Theoretical arguments alone cannot unambiguously 
predict the relationship between management ownership and incorporation of information 
disclosed by company to stock price. This study determines to provide empirical hypotheses 
testing. 
This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, we provide a 
unique focus on firm-level governance characteristics in a fast growing and arguably one of 
the biggest emerging market—Indonesia. Our results help us better understand the effects of 
firm-level investor protection mechanism on firm-specific information capitalization in an 
environment where overall country-level investor protection is relatively poor. Second, our 
study is one of the few, if not the first, to examine, in an emerging market, the informational 
effect of disaggregated of top level management ownership structure i.e. directors‘ stake and 
commissioners‘ stake. Finally, our study extends the underexplored connections between 
ownership structure ‗management ownership‘, as one of proxies of corporate governance as 
argued by Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and Setyaningrum (2005), who investigate the effect 
of corporate governance to company‘s bond rating. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our research 
hypotheses. Section 3 explains how we measure stock price synchronicity in the context of 
the Indonesian market, and specifies our empirical models used for hypothesis testing. 
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Section 4 describes our sample and data sources, and presents descriptive statistics. Section 5 
reports results of our main regressions, while the final section concludes the paper. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
One of key determinants of corporate governance is ownership structure (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1998, 2000). Various prior studies 
were applied around the world testing the influence of board of director structure, and 
composition, management ownership, and capital structure on the financial performance of 
the corporations. In principle, the studies have two opposing views regarding management 
ownership in a company.  
First, incentive alignment as the proponent view. Initial study of Jensen and 
Meckling, (1976) showed that management's equity ownership helps to resolve the agency 
problems and improve the corporation's performance. Jensen (1986; 1993) and Fama and 
Jensen (1985) add that contract of management should include the compensation which are 
material such as stock options, performance shares, and bonuses. Granting stock of company 
aims the manager to feel like the owner of the company so as to encourage management to 
consider its whole policy based on systematic risk and provides the best performance to 
maximize shareholder‘s wealth. 
Under the incentive alignment perspective, management ownership can facilitate the 
alignment of interest between shareholder and management. The implication, then, is that 
concentrated ownership may encourage the management to voluntarily disclose more and 
better firm-specific information for the benefit of shareholders. This improved cost-benefit 
tradeoff facilitates more informed trading, which, in turn, leads to more information being 
impounded into stock prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). One can thus expect that under 
the alignment perspective, synchronicity is inversely related to management ownership, 
ceteris paribus. 
Second, entrenchment incentive as the opposing view. Some studies support the view 
that management‘s equity ownership does not always have a positive effect on corporate 
performance (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). Also, Fama and Jensen (1983), and 
Holderness (2003) demonstrate that managers who own enough stock to dominate the board 
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of directors could expropriate corporate wealth. Entrenched management have an incentive to 
cover up their self-serving, or to limit related information leakage, by withholding 
unfavorable information or selectively disclosing such information that helps them 
camouflage their self-serving behaviors, and/or opportunistically timing the release of value-
relevant, private information to the market. Thus, this condition deters the flow of firm-
specific information to the market, contributing to more opaque information environment. In 
the other hand, other investor without adequate protection may have to bear the relatively 
higher cost of acquiring and processing private information to overcome the information 
opacity, and to avoid the risk of being exploited by the management who own shares in the 
company. The high cost associated with private information search, however, discourages 
informed trading, and thus, impedes the incorporation of firm-specific information into share 
prices (Roll, 1988; Morck et al., 2000; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al. 2010). 
Gul et al. (2010) find that there is a nonlinear function of ownership concentration and 
synchronicity. They predict at some level of ownership, entrenchment could dominate 
alignment effect. This means the entrenchment effect can be mitigated, however, when 
ownership extends beyond a certain level and the firm assumes the characteristics of a 
‗private‘ company owned by the dominant shareholders. When the controlling owner obtains 
effective control of firm, any increase in voting rights does not further entrench the 
controlling owner, but his/her cash-flow rights in the firm mean that it will cost more to 
divert the firm‘s cash flows for private gain (Fan and Wong, 2002). Based on previous 
arguments, we thus test the following hypothesis and in alternative form: 
H1. Stock price synchronicity initially decreases at a decreasing rate as the percentage of 
shares held by the management increases, but it begins to increase as the percentage 
continues to increase beyond a certain level, ceteris paribus. 
 
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
Measurement of Stock Price Synchronicity 
To measure our dependent variable, stock price synchronicity, we need to estimate the 
market model, which allows us to decompose total return variations into two components: 
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those tied to common (market wide and/or sector/industry wide) factors and those tied to 
firm-specific factors. The institutional features of Indonesian markets lead us to posit one 
unanimous specifications of the market model from which we derive measure of 
synchronicity. For all share-issuing firms in our sample, we estimate the following market 
model for each fiscal year: 
                                                            (1) 
      
         
     
         (2) 
        
         
     
         (3) 
 Where, for firm i and day t, RET denotes the daily return on company shares traded 
on Indonesia Stock Exchange, shown in Eq. (2); and MKTRET and SECRET denote the 
value-weighted market return and industry return, respectively, shown in Eq. (3); and ɛ 
represents unspecified random factors. The market return is based on the composite (value 
weighted) IHSG index which reflects all stock price movements in Indonesia Exchange. The 
sector return (SECRET) is based on disaggregated composite published by Indonesia Stock 
Exchange that comprises eight index. In Eq. (1), we include lagged industry and market 
returns to alleviate concerns over potential non-synchronous trading biases that may arise 
from the use of daily returns for estimating the market model (Scholes and Williams, 1997; 
French, Schwert, and Stambaugh, 1987). Estimation of Eq. (1) allows us to effectively isolate 
total return variations tied to (domestic) market wide and industry wide factors from those 
tied to firm-specific factors. 
In estimating Eq. 1, we follow Gul et al. (2010) that requires daily return data be 
available for at least 200 trading days in each fiscal year. As in other studies, stock price 
synchronicity is defined as the ratio of common return variation to total return variation, 
which is equivalent to R2 of market model used. Synchronicity is often measured by the 
regression‘s R-squared value of individual stock returns on market and industry indexes. The 
larger R-squared an individual firm has, the more its stock prices are synchronous with 
market and/or industry returns. Growing number of empirical evidence supports the 
informational interpretation of this proxy (Boubaker et al., 2014). To circumvent the bounded 
nature of R
2
 within [0,1], we use a logistic transformation of  
  
 :  
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          (4) 
 where         is our empirical measure of annual synchronicity for firm i which then 
serves as the dependent variable. 
 
Empirical Models for Hypothesis Testing 
To test for the effects on synchronicity of management ownership in a company, the 
procedures is to estimate the following regression: 
                             ∑             
                          (5) 
                         ∑             
                          (6) 
                          ∑             
                           (7) 
where, for firm i and year T,            represents the percentages of shares held by the 
largest shareholder at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
 Following previous related researchs (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Chan and 
Hameed, 2006; Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Gul et al., 2010), we include a total of seven control 
variables that are known to influence synchronicity, that is: annual trading volume turnover, 
trading volume computed as the total number of shares traded in a year, divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year (VOL). Firm size is computed as 
the log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (SIZE). Leverage is computed as total 
liabilities divided by total assets (LEV). Volatility of a firm‘s earnings stream measured by 
the standard deviation of a firm‘s return on assets (ROA)s over the preceding five-quarter 
period, including the current quarter (STDROA). Market-to-book ratio is computed as the 
total market value of equity, divided by the total net assets at the end of the fiscal year (M/B). 
The number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs is accounted with natural log of 
the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs (INDNUM). Industry size is 
measured as the log of year-end total assets of all sample firms in the industry to which a firm 
belongs (INDSIZE). Year and industry dummies are included to control for potential year and 
industry fixed effects. At first, we run regression of Eq. (5), (6), (7) and modify them by 
adding quadratic variable to test non-linearity. The resulting equations are as follows:  
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                                (8) 
        
                            
   ∑             
          
                        (9) 
                                     
   ∑             
          
                           (10) 
 All of the equations are meant to test consistency between linearity and nonlinearity 
of price synchronicity and management ownership. 
 
SAMPLE 
 
Sample and Data Sources 
Our sample period covers the three-year period, 2013-2015. We extract stock return, 
market data, and accounting data from the Datastream and from Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) annual fact book. Ownership-related data as to shares held by the management 
(pengurus perusahaan) and their identity (commissioner or director held) are manually 
collected, mainly from annual reports of individual companies, and in some cases 
supplemented from other data sources, including company web sites, the Indonesia Financial 
Service Authority (OJK) database. This study limits the samples to non-financial firms, since 
financial corporations are heavily regulated and governed by specific accounting standards, 
making their accounting numbers incomparable to those of other firms (Boubaker et al., 
2014). Firms with insufficient ownership information or missing financial data for computing 
control variables were excluded from the sample. We allow firms to enter and exit the panel 
to limit the effect of survivorship bias. The final (unbalanced) samples comprise 739 firm-
year observations. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. In the table below, R2 and SYNCH are R2 
statistic and the synchronicity measures, respectively, computed from Eq. 1. The mean and 
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median R2 are 0.14003 and 0.05506, respectively. This means that on average 5% to 14% 
stock price movements of sample companies is explained by the market and the industry 
sectors‘ dynamics. These statistics are relatively incomparable to the reported mean R2 of 
0.454 for China in the sample of Gul et al. (2010). The mean and median SYNCH are -
2.65202 and -2.84278, respectively. The measure of SYNCH is computed using the same 
specification of the market model used in Gul et al. (2010), who report the mean and median 
of -0.232 and -0.151, respectively, which are higher than our corresponding measures. This 
suggests that compared with Chinese firms, stock prices of Indonesia-listed firms tend to co-
move, to a lesser (greater) extent, with market wide and/or industry wide information (firm-
specific information). Both R2 and SYNCH display considerable cross-sectional variations as 
reflected in the relatively high standard deviations and inter quantile ranges. For example, 
SYNCH is -4.06659 at the lower quartile, while it is -1.80695 at the upper quartile, with a 
standard deviation of 1.71764. Given that all firms in our sample come from a single country, 
this significantly high variation in synchronicity across firms suggests that the flow of firm-
specific information to market varies widely across firms within the country. Table 1 also 
shows that, on average, the largest shareholder holds 4.02% of shares outstanding, and it 
reveals close to be block holder ownership structure in Indonesia. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
5th 
Pctl. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 
95th 
Pctl. 
R
2
 0.14003 0.18278 
0.0000
0 0.01313 0.05506 0.12986 0.52023 
SYNCH 
-
2.65202 1.71764 
-
5.3199
9 -4.06659 -2.84278 -1.80695 0.11728 
MGTSHARE 0.04018 0.12421 
0.0000
0 0.00000 0.00013 0.00731 0.23208 
COMSHARE 0.01764 0.07177 
0.0000
0 0.00000 0.00000 0.00039 0.09142 
DIRSHARE 0.02254 0.08586 
0.0000
0 0.00000 0.00000 0.00060 0.11514 
VOL 0.39019 0.67961 
0.0005
0 0.02784 0.17133 0.42690 1.48672 
SIZE 9.44833 0.67942 
8.1788
9 8.86636 9.44871 9.83109 
10.4725
7 
LEV 0.51427 0.44427 
0.1055
1 0.30553 0.49529 0.64165 0.88882 
STDROA 2.81036 8.42142 
0.3108
6 0.76948 1.44957 2.56518 7.83417 
M/B 
15.7249
5 
213.8571
0 
0.1500
0 0.69750 1.41000 2.83000 8.16750 
INDNUM 2.66167 0.81613 
1.0986
1 2.19722 2.70805 3.36730 3.82864 
INDSIZE 
10.9099
3 0.52781 
9.7035
1 10.65353 10.98107 11.21753 
11.4868
8 
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Table 2A and Table 2B present the matrix of Pearson pair wise correlations between 
major variables and significance level. Consistent with our expectations, SYNCH is 
negatively correlated with our interest variable, which is partly in line with the H1. From 
Table 2B, we can see MGTSHARE and DIRSHARE significantly correlated with negative 
impact to SYNCH. In order to get affirmative correlation, the analysis proceeds to 
multivariate regression. 
 
  
              
 
                                                                                                                                                     60 
                        piabc.fe.unpar.ac.id  
    
 
Table 2A. Correlation Matrix 
  R2 SYNCH MGT_OWNSHP COM_OWN DIR_OWN VOL SIZE LEV STD_ROA M_B INDNUM INDSIZE 
R2 1.0000 0.8930 -0.0800 -0.0232 -0.0962 0.1944 0.5574 -0.0322 -0.0837 -0.0008 -0.0116 0.1895 
SYNCH 0.8930 1.0000 -0.0632 -0.0311 -0.0653 0.2355 0.5624 -0.0556 -0.0806 0.0141 -0.0458 0.1743 
MGT_OWNSHP -0.0800 -0.0632 1.0000 0.7407 0.8274 -0.0570 -0.0967 -0.0352 0.0024 0.0181 -0.0675 -0.0485 
COM_OWN -0.0232 -0.0311 0.7407 1.0000 0.2357 -0.0448 -0.0416 -0.0299 0.0238 0.0513 0.0198 0.0358 
DIR_OWN -0.0962 -0.0653 0.8274 0.2357 1.0000 -0.0450 -0.1051 -0.0259 -0.0164 -0.0167 -0.1142 -0.1001 
VOL 0.1944 0.2355 -0.0570 -0.0448 -0.0450 1.0000 0.0128 0.0154 -0.0477 -0.0007 -0.0115 0.0166 
SIZE 0.5574 0.5624 -0.0967 -0.0416 -0.1051 0.0128 1.0000 -0.0215 -0.0852 -0.0805 -0.0147 0.3183 
LEV -0.0322 -0.0556 -0.0352 -0.0299 -0.0259 0.0154 -0.0215 1.0000 0.3475 -0.0776 0.0294 -0.0207 
STD_ROA -0.0837 -0.0806 0.0024 0.0238 -0.0164 -0.0477 -0.0852 0.3475 1.0000 -0.0148 0.0753 0.0393 
M_B -0.0008 0.0141 0.0181 0.0513 -0.0167 -0.0007 -0.0805 -0.0776 -0.0148 1.0000 -0.1217 -0.1199 
INDNUM -0.0116 -0.0458 -0.0675 0.0198 -0.1142 -0.0115 -0.0147 0.0294 0.0753 -0.1217 1.0000 0.7121 
INDSIZE 0.1895 0.1743 -0.0485 0.0358 -0.1001 0.0166 0.3183 -0.0207 0.0393 -0.1199 0.7121 1.0000 
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Table 2B. Correlation Matrix 
Correlation           
Probability R2 
SYNC
H MGTSHARE 
COMSHA
RE 
DIRSHA
RE 
R
2 
 1     
 -----     
SYNCH  0.893005 1    
 0.0000 -----    
MGTSHARE  -0.07995 
-
0.0631
5 1   
 0.0298 0.0862 -----   
COMSHARE  
-
0.023243 
-
0.0311
4 0.740737 1  
 0.5281 0.3980 0.0000 -----  
DIRSHARE  
-
0.096229 
-
0.0653
3 0.827446 0.235677 1 
  0.0089 0.0759 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
 
 
RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS 
Table 3 below reports regression results for Eq. (5), (6), (7), respectively, but we 
leave the quadratic variable in order to only test linearity correlation. Reported t-values are 
not shown but rather we marked the coefficient with superscripts a, b, and c that denote the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. As seen in column H1a, the coefficient 
on MGTSHARE is insignificantly negative. This indicates that synchronicity decreases as 
management ownership increases. This is consistent with the hypotheses H1, however, the 
result cannot be generalized to the whole sample. We also tested separated ownership of the 
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management against synchronicity. The outputs are shown at Table 3, column H2b and H3c 
in which we can see the results consistently support the result of H1a. However, both results 
cannot be generalized to the whole sample. 
Morck et al. (1988) finds that there is significant nonmonotonic relationship between 
management ownership and market valuation. Another study by Gul et al. (2010) found that 
there is a concave function between synchronicity and ownership. Since both studies have 
evidence about nonlinear relation between management ownership and price and/or 
synchronicity, we test our hypotheses, H1. Table 4 reports the regression result of Eq. (8), 
(9), (10). All of three interest variables consistently support the arguments of the nonlinier 
relationship. As the ownership of management rises the more synchronicity will be. Hence, 
management ownership can less benefit the stakeholder by less supporting the transmission 
of information to stock prices, for example management reduce voluntary disclosure which in 
turn increase synchronicity. 
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Table 3. Regression results of the effect of management ownership on stock price 
synchronicity 
Variable H1a H2b H3c 
MGTSHARE -0.039634   
COMSHARE  -0.092138  
DIRSHARE   -0.024774 
VOL 0.561201a 0.561133a 0.562503a 
SIZE 1.38007a 1.380325a 1.377385a 
LEV -0.1324 -0.132611 -0.135469 
STDROA -0.001825 -0.001804 -0.001869 
M/B 0.000439c 0.000441c 0.000438c 
INDNUM -0.123513 -0.123287 -0.120364 
INDSIZE 0.167298 0.167635 0.166998 
    
YR_DUMMY 0.170036 0.170088 0.173727 
STR_DUMMY 0.000517 0.00047 0.000473 
C -17.49912a -17.50504a -17.47914a 
R-squared 0.381353 0.381359 0.380452 
Adjusted R-squared 0.372855 0.372861 0.371954 
 
The dependent variable is SYNCH(1), and is estimated using Eq. (5), (6), (7). We do 
not present t-values for simplicity of the table. However, we use superscripts a, b, and c that 
denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 4. Regression Results of the Nonlinear Effect of Management                              
Ownership on Stock Price Synchronicity 
Variable H1.1 H2.1 H3.1 
MGTSHARE -0.174967     
MGTSHARE^2 0.214706    
COMSHARE  -0.674816   
COMSHARE^2   1.124991   
DIRSHARE    
-
0.912988 
DIRSHARE^2    1.591377 
VOL 0.560908a 0.561297a 0.561414 
SIZE 1.378849a 1.377835a 1.371248 
LEV -0.132862 -0.133548 
-
0.133674 
STDROA -0.001829 -0.001782 -0.00203 
M/B 0.000441c 0.000449c 0.000439 
INDNUM -0.124185 -0.122554 
-
0.124613 
INDSIZE 0.169642 0.167338 0.18668 
    
YR_DUMMY 0.170248a 0.170612 0.175017 
STR_DUMMY 0.000503 0.000569 0.000233 
C 
-
17.50924a 
-
17.47788a 
-
17.61455 
      
R-squared 0.381364 0.381465 0.380853 
Adjusted R-squared 0.372003 0.372106 0.371498 
  
The regressions also have coefficient of control variables. The VOL coefficients are 
significantly positive (p<0.00) across all columns. This suggests that active trading hinders 
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the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices. This result is inconsistent 
with US finding from the study of Piotroski and Roulstone (2004). The SIZE coefficients are 
significantly positive (p<0.00). This result indicates that stock prices of large Indonesian 
firms tend to mirror the market to a greater extent than do those of small firms: large firms 
constitute a major proportion of firms included in the market and industry indexes, and these 
firms are highly diversified, particularly in emerging markets such as Indonesia (Chan and 
Hameed, 2006). The M/B coefficients are significantly positive (p<0.00), which suggest that 
firms with high growth potential tend to have less firm-specific information incorporated into 
their stock prices. The remaining coefficient estimates are insignificant in all regression. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We investigate whether and how stock price synchronicity is associated with firm-
level corporate governance characteristic unique to Indonesia. The firm-level governance 
variable we examine is management‘s ownership of shares in the company they work. In 
addition, we also examine the disaggregated composition of the ownership i.e. directors‘ 
share ownership and commissioners‘ shares ownership. This study concludes two findings. 
First, we find negative correlation between our variables of interest i.e. management‘s 
shares ownership, directors‘ shares ownership, and commissioners‘ shares ownership with 
stock price synchronicity. This result support the view that there are two theories explaining 
ownership of management affect the company information environment. Second, there is 
concave relation between synchronicity and management ownership: as percentage of 
ownership increases, synchronicity decreases at a decreasing rate up to its maximum 
threshold, after which it begins to decrease. 
This study findings provides policy implications to stock market stakeholders in 
developing economies such as Indonesia. An important policy objective in emerging markets 
is the efficient allocation of scarce capital. This objective can be better achieved when stock 
prices closely track firm fundamentals by reflecting all variable, firm specific information in 
an accurate and timely manner. In order to achieve the informational and functional 
efficiency of capital markets, improving firm-level governance is as important as improving 
country-level governance. In particular, our results suggest that the capitalization of firm-
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specific information into stock prices in emerging markets could be facilitated by giving 
some reward or demanding management to hold some shares of the company as proposed by 
the classical study of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Hence, flow of information can be best 
reflected in stock prices. 
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